Non-interference and Strategic Interests at Prime: Responses to Marcos’ Martial Law

 

By Sean Matthew Parra

How did ASEAN and the international community respond to Marcos' martial law?

When Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines on September 21, 1972 (Official Gazette of the Philippines, n.d), the response varied across the globe, with geopolitical interests, non-interference policies and the post-Cold War landscape taking the stage.

At the time of martial law, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was still in its infancy. Four years after the attempt of MAPHILINDO, ASEAN's focus was regional cooperation, economic growth and political stability. 

Central to its principles was the notion of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. During that time, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation guided the principles of non-interference (ASEAN, 1967). This was a critical aspect that shaped ASEAN's muted response to Marcos' martial law and the consecutive events that followed. For the most part, ASEAN and other member states remained silent to Marcos' crackdown.

For instance, for its regional neighbors, Marcos' martial law came at a critical moment in Southeast Asian history. Indonesia, under Suharto, had just undergone a brutal anti-communist movement just a few years before the Philippines' martial law. After a coup attempt in 1965, Suharto led a similar campaign against suspected communists, which resulted in widespread killings and political repression.

By the time Marcos declared martial law, Suharto's government had gained power through military dominance and a similar emphasis on anti-communism. In 1979, when Suharto visited the Philippines, he encouraged Marcos to draw inspiration from Indonesia's experience in controlling political instability (Fibiger, 2023).

Meanwhile, Malaysia was also dealing with similar internal threats. The country had recently ended a communist insurgency that lasted from 1948 to 1960 called the "Malayan Emergency." 

However, in 1968 they were facing new communist challenges through the resurgence of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Four years prior to the Philippine's martial law, the party ambushed Kroh-Betong and renewed domestic tension that lasted until the end of 1989 when the MCP agreed to disband and end its conflict with the government. It was formally ended by signing a peace accord in Thailand (Hack, 2022). 

In Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister at the time, initially had a good impression of Marcos, describing him and his wife as gracious hosts when he conducted a state visit in 1974. He considered Marcos an ally against communism and a partner, being a member of ASEAN,  in fostering regional stability (Weatherbee, 1987; Abad, 2022). 

Nevertheless, when the escalation of human rights abuses and the assassination of former Senator Ninoy Aquino transpired, Lee’s view became critical towards Marcos’ authoritarian rule. In his book, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965 - 2000, he shared his thoughts about the Marcos administration, stating that the Philippines was “pillaged” while emphasizing the country’s “soft and forgiving culture” (Abad, 2022).

For Thailand, its relations with the Philippines were strong during this time. This golden years of diplomacy occurred from the 1950s to the 1980s, a time when the two countries were in the process of pump-priming economic development and progress amidst the mounting communist threat (Chongkittavorn, 2022).

On the other hand, the United States (U.S.) under Nixon, a major Western power in the international community, prioritized its political interests in the region. In the case of the Philippines, it served as a home to important U.S. military bases, including Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, which were crucial for American military operations in Asia.

According to Kessler (1986), the overall concern of U.S foreign policy in the Philippines was the protection of the U.S military bases in the country. Marcos understood this to be consistent with all five American presidents from 1965 to 1985. For different reasons and at different times, U.S support for Marcos was heavy.

Lyndon B. Johnson referred to him as his “right arm in Asia" in 1966. He wanted Philippine military participation in the Vietnam war, to which he received two engineer battalions. Negotiating a Vietnam settlement, Nixon wanted the Philippines and other friendly Asian states to assume a responsibility for their security issues. While Gerald Ford’s priority after the fall of Vietnam was enhanced security assistance from Pacific allies and retaining U.S military bases in the Philippines - this was to protect American interests in the Indian Ocean and oil supply lines from the Middle East.

Ignoring the internal conditions of Asia-Pacific countries, for all administrations the key point of U.S foreign policy was continued access to the American bases in the region, including the Philippines, as the Secretary of State then, Henry Kissinger (1976) stated “the linchpin of our Asian security effort must be a strong and balanced U.S military posture in the Pacific.”

In contrast, local and international human rights organizations, like Amnesty International, were active in condemning Marcos. To this day, they report extensively on human rights abuses that occurred during martial law, including illegal arrests, torture and extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International, 2022).

Martial law showed the problematic balance between national sovereignty, regional stability, and international diplomacy. ASEAN's silence reflected the region's preoccupation with non-interference, while the US and the international community's mixed response showed the complexities of Cold War politics and strategic military alliances.

Today, martial law remains a critical moment in the history of the Philippines, reminding the world of the consequences when strategic interests are placed above human rights.

References:

Abad, M. (2022, September 7). LOOK BACK: How Singapore father Lee Kuan Yew viewed Ferdinand Marcos. RAPPLER. https://www.rappler.com/philippines/lookback-lee-kuan-yew-thoughts-ferdinand-marcos/

Amnesty International. (2022, September 21). Five things to know about Martial Law in the Philippines. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/04/five-things-to-know-about-martial-law-in-the-philippines/

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (n.d.). Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/outward-looking-community/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-tac/

Chongkittavorn, K. (2022, July 5). Time to strategise Thai-Philippine ties. https://www.bangkokpost.com. https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2339852/time-to-strategise-thai-philippine-ties

Djakababa, Y. (2024). Suharto’s Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World Suharto’s Cold War: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the World , by Mattias Fibiger, New York, Oxford University Press, 2023, xviii + 357 pp., £29.99 (hbk), ISBN 9780197667224. South East Asia Research, 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1080/0967828x.2024.2386769

Hack, K. (2022). The Malayan Emergency: Revolution and counterinsurgency at the end of Empire. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/malayan-emergency/B991D0A3E65053C10CB93E18DBA62A36

Kessler, R. J. (1986). Marcos and the Americans. Foreign Policy, 63, 40. https://doi.org/10.2307/1148755

Official Gazette of the Philippines. (n.d.). Declaration of martial law | Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/declaration-of-martial-law/

Weatherbee, D. E. (1987). The Philippines and ASEAN: Options for Aquino. Asian Survey, 27(12), 1223–1239. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644631